Although the details of the Cuban missile crisis have been told countless times, relations between the United States and France figure minimally in most accounts. Most scholars view Charles de Gaulle's reaction as a derivative of a classic balance of power axiom about alliances that during times of crisis between the US and the Soviet Union, France was a firm ally, while in times of decreased superpower tension, France sought independence from American dominance. Other historians regard de Gaulle's irritation over lack of tripartite consultation as standard reflex. The problem with both conclusions is that scholars mistakenly dismiss de Gaulle's foreign policy demands as "sound and fury" about being informed rather than consulted. By dwelling on France's exclusion from the process of Western nuclear decision-making, scholars have perpetuated the myth of tripartism and neglected de Gaulle's substantive concerns. 2 While US interaction with France is not central to the unfolding of the thirteen-day missile drama, cursory depictions of de Gaulle and the other Western allies as anxious bystanders and then resentful obstructionists overlook important elements of the crisis and its aftermath. The United States never viewed the Cuban missile ordeal as a conflict between themselves or exclusively restricted to a showdown in the Caribbean. For the United States, the Cuban missile crisis was more accurately viewed as a twin Cuban-Berlin crisis. Many in the West believed Khrushchev's motives for installing nuclear missiles in Cuba were set against the backdrop of the perennial Berlin question. As Marc Trachtenberg describes it, a "mutual hostage situation" had developed between Cuba and Berlin. 3 Recently published transcriptions of Kennedy's presidential recordings from this period reveal the extent to which a linkage between the Cuban missile crisis and a renewed crisis over Berlin was certainly the expectation created in Washington. Whether the Soviets intended a linkage is unclear. An authoritative account of Khrushchev's motives and actions prior to and during the Cuban missile crisis, which draws on documents from the former Soviet Union, refutes any direct connection between Khrushchev's attempt to place missiles in Cuba and his attempt to cut off Western access to Berlin, but Soviet materials related to Berlin are limited. Nevertheless, the constant consideration of how events in the Caribbean could affect Berlin, as well as the converse, figured prominently in Washington's evaluation of its response options. 4 Influenced by US reports and actions, the French government and other major West European allies were forced to view the tense days of October 1962 as a parallel crisis when in fact they were not. If the building of the Berlin Wall had worried de Gaulle about Kennedy's reckless crisis management and highlighted FrancoAmerican strategic differences, the Cuban missile crisis reinforced those differences. The 13 days of October 1962 catalyzed a series of French calculations that culminated in de Gaulle's double non of participation in the MLF and Britain's EEC candidacy as well as his signing of the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship in January 1963.
